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Abstract 
 The aim of this study is to examine the determinants of the capital 
structure of banks in European Union. The data spans a six year period from 
2007-2012.In this study we investigate whether the standard determinants of 
capital structure apply to banks during the financial crisιs period. Fixed effects 
panel data analysis is employed with dependent variable, book leverage. Our 
findings, suggest that the standard determinants of capital structure have an 
explanatory power on book leverage. Though, the direction of impact is not 
always the prospective. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis generates a renewed interest for 
banks due to their influence within a financial system and the economy. Since 
banks affect the economy a crucial issue is what governs their capital 
decisions. The need to determine these factors are the  cumulative 
impairment losses of bank loan portfolio, losses of deposits and the extended 
need for financing from the European Central Bank. 
 In general, capital structure refers to a variety of alternatives sources 
of funds   with which a firm finances its overall operations and growth. It is a 
combination of a company's long-term debt, specific short-term debt, hybrid 
securities, common equity and preferred equity. Requirements in short term 
funds change from period to period for this reason there is no such strict 
policy for the sources of these funds. On the other hand, a policy is crucial in 
order to generate long term funds. A financial decision making process 
focuses on the determination of optimal capital structure. 
The determinants of capital structure are very hot issue in the literature 
of finance. The  famous Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition  states that in 
an efficient market in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, 
and asymmetric information a firm’s value is not affected by its chosen capital 
structure. It does not matter whether the capital  is acquired by issuing shares 
or selling debt. This theory is considered the basis of modern thinking on 
capital structure and it is also known as “Capital structure irrelevance 
principle”. Following the generative work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), a 
theoretical literature developed, which led to other substitutional theories, 
such as the static trade off theory, pecking order theory and agency cost 
theory.  
Many researchers, by studying the above mentioned theories 
conducted surveys on capital structure .They include  in their research 
different  bank specific, industry specific  and macroeconomic variables and 
they managed to identify  some key  determinant factors. Although researches 
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on capital structure of non financial firms have been made on a great extent, 
there is need for further investigation for capital structure of financial firms.     
One of the most significant articles for the bank capital structure is this 
of Reint Gropp and Florian Heider (2010).However, there is little literature 
examining the influence of the recent economic crises on the determinants of 
bank capital structure. Michele Nascimento Juca, Almir Ferreira de Sousa & 
Albert Fishlow (2012) examine the capital structure determinants of North 
American Banks   before ( 2003-2006)and during  the systemic crisis period 
(2007 -2010). 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the determinants of capital 
structure of commercial banks of the European Union of 15countries during 
the financial crisis (2007-2012), with intention to contribute to the limited 
literature. In order to conduct our study, we use a panel data regression 
analysis. We run one regression with only bank specific variables and another 
one including macroeconomic variables in order to detect their impact to 
leverage. The bank specific variables where we use are: LN(total 
assets),ROAA ,the ratio  fixed assets to total assets ,the ratio net loans to total 
assets, the ratio Liquid Assets to  Deposits & Sort term Funding  and the ratio 
loan loss provisions to total assets and the macroeconomic variables are: 
inflation and GDP growth rate. 
 The rest of this study is organized as follows. In the second section we 
analyze the role of supervisory authorities. In the third section we analyze the 
capital structure theories. In the fourth section we review the literature on the 
determinants of bank capital structure. In the fifth section we analyze the 
determinants of capital structure that we use in our analysis. In the sixth 
section we empirically analyze the determinants of bank capital structure 
using regression analysis. Furthermore in this section we analyze our data 
and the methodology we use. Finally in the seventh section we draw 
conclusions.  
6 
 
2. The role of supervisory authorities 
The financial sector and especially commercial banks constitute the 
most strictly supervised companies. They had the capability of issue money 
where this increases the liquidity of an economy, furthermore affects the 
inflation and other financial figures. Moreover the citizens of a country trust 
the banks to save their money. So the handling of money should be done with 
caution and prudence.  
For a long period banking regulation was national. Governments and 
their regulatory agencies promoted rules and banking supervisory guidelines 
particular to the country’s needs. Regulatory rules were fairly different 
between countries. Not until 1988 when Basel I accord was released, did 
international banking regulations take shape. Basel accords outline regulatory 
guidelines for international banks’ operation and risk management. The Basel 
Committee acknowledged a need to strengthen the international banking 
systems’ ability to endure shocks. The Committee wanted to level the 
competitive field by standardizing national capital requirements. Lower capital 
requirements or higher leverage reveal that a bank can use more debt in 
order to finance the loans it makes and this lead in reduction of the cost of 
funds and in increase of profitability. 
In July 1988, the Committee released Basel I accord. The accord was 
the first international attempt to relate the risks a bank takes with banks’ 
equity .Both regulators and economists admitted that banks which operated 
prudently are characterized by higher capital ratios. Moreover they take fewer 
risks and suffer from losses not as often as other banks. Also the more equity 
they have the greater the possibility to absorb losses. The accord provided a 
common framework for capital assessment as a function of the riskiness of 
assets. Basel I addressed only credit risk although it recognizes that banks 
must also guard against other kinds of risk. 
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The accord created two minimum capital ratios: 
• “Tier 1” A bank’s core capital which was to be at least 4% of risk 
weighted assets and 
• “Capital ratio” a bank’s total capital which included “Tier 2” components 
and was to be at least 8% of risk weighted assets 
For regulatory capital purposes, banks could hold capital in two tiers: 
Tier 1-core capital and Tier 2-supplementary capital. Tier 1 and Tier 2 with 
some adjustments equal the regulatory capital. 
In 1999 the Committee issued a proposal for a new capital framework 
to replace Basel I. The new accord suggested a connection more closely of 
capital requirements with concrete risks incurred by banks. As well it intended 
to widen the risks that banks take into consideration when calculating their 
minimum capital requirements. In 2004, after many conferences a new capital 
framework, Basel II was introduced. Basel II Accord consists of three pillars to 
accomplish consistent capital adequacy requirements for active international 
banks.   
• Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirements 
• Pillar 2: Supervisory review process 
• Pillar 3: Market discipline 
The aim of Pillar 1 is to set capital requirements as a function of credit, 
market and operational risk exposures of bank .Tier 1 and Tier 2 were first 
defined in Basel I and remained substantial the same also in Basel II .But 
there is an appearance, of Tier 3, which includes a wider range of 
subordinated debt than that of Tier 2 and can contain profits from bank’s 
trading activities. “Tier 3 can only be used to support the market risk the bank 
takes in its trading book”. Instruments which can be estimated as Tier 3 are 
very risky to be used for material portions of bank’s capital computations. 
Some items cannot be included in a bank’s computation of regulatory capital. 
These are goodwill, stocks held by the bank in another bank and investments 
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in subsidiaries with business in banking and similar activities under specific 
circumstances. Pillar I requires banks to measure the riskiness of their assets 
using the approaches presenting on the table below  with respect to credit, 
market and operational risk. 
Table 1: Methods for calculating capital according Basel II 
Credit  risk   
 
• Standardized approach 
• Foundation IRB 
        Advanced IRB approach 
Market risk • Standardized approach 
• Ιnternal Models approach 
Operational risk • Basic Indicator Approach 
• Standardized Approach 
• Advanced measurement 
approach 
  
 
 
From the above the following values have derived: 
• Total risk weighted assets for credit risk (RWAC) 
• Market risk capital requirements (CRM) 
• Operational risk capital requirement (CRO) 
So the total risk weighted assets value of a bank can be computes as: 
                                 RWAT = RWAC+12,5* (CRM+CRO) 
The eligible regulatory capital (RC) would be computed as: 
RC= Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital –Deductions 
The Basel II minimum capital requirements: 
     RC/RWAT ≥8% 
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Pillar 2: Supervisory review process 
The supervisory review ensures compliance with minimum capital 
requirements and also emboldens banks to develop and use better risk 
management techniques in monitoring and managing risks. It provides a 
framework for dealing with  risks a bank may face, like pension risk ,systemic 
risk, ,concentration risk, reputational risk,  strategic risk, liquidity risk and legal 
risk, which the accord combines under the title of residual risk. It gives banks 
a power to review their risk management system. Moreover Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) is the result of Pillar II. Supervisors 
might also oblige banks to maintain additional capital if they are not 
persuaded that that current capital is adequate for the risks faced by the 
assets of the bank.  
 
Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
The intention of Pillar 3 is to complement the supervisory review 
process and the minimum capital requirements by developing a set of 
disclosure requirements that will allow the market participants to assess the 
capital adequacy of an institute. Disclosure requirements ensure that 
corporate entities give information for their financial performance to investors. 
Firms are obligated to conduct financial statements and these must be signed 
by external auditors. Moreover publicly traded companies ought to make 
additional disclosures required by the exchange on which their shares are 
traded. Pillar 3 is concentrated on capital information and not in financial 
performance .It addresses the firm’s capital adequacy, risk exposures and 
capital structure. Banks are required to make their disclosures at least twice a 
year. 
Finally when market participants have an adequate understanding of a 
bank’s businesses and the controls it has in place to manage its exposures, 
they can better distinguish between banking organizations so that they can 
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reward those that manage their risks prudentially and punish those that do 
not. 
Basel III is a global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, 
stress testing and market liquidity risk agreed upon by the members of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2010-11, and programmed  to be 
introduced from 2013 until 2018. Basel III was developed in response to the 
vacancies in financial regulation disclosed by the late-2000s financial crisis. 
Basel III goal is to: 
• Strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures 
• Amend risk management and governance  
• Amend the ability of banks to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress whatever the source 
In conclusion Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and 
introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. 
However it is useful to mention the opinion of critics who believe that that 
rigorous regulation is responsible for the slow recovery from the financial 
crisis and that Basel III requirements will heighten the incentives of banks to 
game the regulatory framework and that could induce the stability of the 
financial system negatively. 
 
3. Capital structure theories 
The theory of business finance in a modern sense begins with the  
“Capital structure irrelevance principle” of Modigliani and Miller (1958).Their 
theorem  states that in an efficient market  a firm’s value is not affected by its 
capital structure. According to theory, all have the same information and it 
assumes that no transactions cost, bankruptcy cost or taxation exist. A firm’s 
value is not induced whether its capital is acquired by issuing stock or selling 
debt, neither from its dividend policy. Following the generative work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), a theoretical literature developed, which led to 
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other substitutional theories. Four key theories where developed over the 
years: the static trade off theory, pecking order theory and agency cost theory 
and market timing theory.  
According to the static trade-off theory a firm concludes how much debt 
or equity financing to use by weighting the costs and profits. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) provide a classic statement of the theory, who considered 
that optimal leverage, reflects a trade-off between the deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy and the tax saving benefits of debt. Myers (1984) states that 
according to the trade -off theory a company determines a target debt to 
equity ratio and then tries to approximate the target. Debt financing is 
regarded as better than equity financing since the first gets tax shields on 
interest while equity is subject to corporate tax. The target is determined by 
balancing interest tax shields of debt against costs of  financial distress. The 
company is balancing the costs and benefits of borrowings, keeping stable its 
assets and investment plans. 
 Pecking order theory indicates the preference of companies to 
generate internal funds (like retained earnings or excess liquid assets) from 
external funds. The theory  tries to capture the costs of asymmetric 
information. Managers are supposed to know  the true condition of the  
company and when they issue new  shares investors believe that they think 
that the company  is overvalued and that they are  trying to take advantage of 
this over-valuation. Investors rationally discount the company's share price 
when managers issue equity rather than riskless debt. 
 Myers and Majluf(1984) draw attention to the use of debt to omit the 
inefficiencies in a firm’s investment decisions that would be caused from 
information asymmetries.  Myers (1984) developed the Pecking order theory 
which is based on the previous work of Donaldson (1961) .According to Myers 
(1984) companies prefer internal funds because  they do not present  flotation 
costs and do not need additional disclosure financial information about the 
firms’ investment opportunities and their potential gains. If a company has to 
use external funds  it will define its hierarchy  of its financial sources as:  debt 
,convertible securities, preferred stock, and  last common stock . Empirical 
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evidence support both trade off theory and pecking order .According  to a 
study  of Fama and French (2002) to detect whether the pecking order or the 
trade-off theory is a better predictor of capital structure they  found  support 
for both theories. 
Agency cost theory states that company’s capital structure is specified 
by agency costs, which includes the costs for  debt and equity issue. Costs 
related to equity issue can be: the monitoring expenditures of the equity 
holders and  the bond expenditures of the manager. On the other hand debt 
issue increases the manager’s motive to invest in risky projects which yield 
higher returns but also increases the possibility of failure where debt holders 
have to share if it is materialized. If debt holders expect such a situation  they 
will require a higher premium  which will  result in an increment of the costs of 
debt. The extent of these costs is limited by how well the owners supervise 
the actions of the managers. 
The theory deals with a conflict of interest among two parties. Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling (1976) were the first who developed a 
theoretical model of agency costs. According to their theory two types of 
conflicts exist: conflicts between shareholders and managers and conflicts 
between shareholders and bondholders.  For example a conflict arises when  
a manager instead of acting for the interest of the shareholders of a company, 
maximizing their wealth, he takes decisions in his own interest. On the other 
hand  conflicts between shareholders and bondholders  exist due to the fact 
that shareholders or their representatives  take decisions removing  wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. 
The market timing theory of capital structure suggests that companies 
time their equity issues. They issue new stock when the  share price is 
considered  overvalued, and buy back own shares when there is 
undervaluation. There are two interpretations of equity market timing. The first 
reckons economic agents to be rational. Firms are supposed to issue equity 
immediately after a positive information release, which decreases  the 
asymmetry problem among the company’s management and shareholders. 
The second theory reckons that  agents are  irrational (Baker and Wurgler, 
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2002). Due to irrational behavior there is a time-varying mispricing of the 
share of the firm. Managers issue equity when they believe  its cost is 
irrationally low and repurchase equity when they think  its cost is irrationally 
high. The second interpretation of market timing does not indicate that the 
market must be inefficient.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) specified a market timing measure, which is 
a weighted average of external capital needs over the past few years, where 
the weights used are market to book values of the company. They discovered 
that leverage alterations are strongly and positively related to their market 
timing measure, so they inferred that the capital structure of a company is the 
cumulative result of past efforts to time the equity market.We can say that 
Market timing theory has challenged the precedent theories.But all theories 
have weak parts, so it is not strange that there is a lot of research on this 
issue. 
 
4. Literature review 
Capital structure is one of the major  topics amongst scholars in 
finance. Many researchers by  studying  the above mentioned theories 
conducted surveys about the capital structure of non financial firms and they 
managed to found various determinants that affect  it.These factors may 
include size ,growth opportunities , profitability and other. Among these 
researchers ,De Angelo and Masulis (1980)  developed  a model of  corporate 
leverage choice in the presence of personal and corporate taxes.They tested  
some hypotheses  with reference to time series and   cross sectional 
properties of companies leverage decisions and also to  personal tax rates 
implicit in market prices. Their model determines an optimal capital structure 
taking into  consideration corporate and personal taxes. They stated that the 
optimal capital structure decision depends on the industry because tax rates 
differ among industries.  
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Although there is a large literature on the determinants of capital 
structure of non financial companies a small number of researchers have 
dealt with capital structure decisions of banks.  Moreover it’s a common belief 
that capital structure of banks does not need any research due to capital 
regulations which affect financing decisions. According to Mishkin(2000) 
«Because of the high  costs of holding capital (….), bank managers often 
want to hold less bank capital than is required by the regulatory authorities.In 
this case, the amount of bank capital is determined by the bank capital 
requirements ».Below we report the most significant  studies  on capital 
structure of banks. 
Berger , Herring and Szegö (1995) investigated the role of capital for 
financial institutions, specifically they concentrated on commercial banks in 
United States.They stated that many departures from the frictionless world of 
Modigliani and Miller can explain market capital `requirements'(the ratio of 
equity to assets) for banks, these are: taxes, cost of financial distress and 
asymmetric information problems and transaction costs. Interest payments 
decrease tax payments, on the other hand dividends do not decrease them, 
as a result banks  will prefer debt in their  capital structure.Moreover Berger 
(1995) found a positive relationship among capital ratios and earnings for 
USA banks during 1980s .In that period the possibility  of  a bank to fail and 
the expected costs of financial distress raised market capital requirements.  
Furthermore the authors found that asymmetric information  and 
transactions costs of issuing new shares affect costs of internal against 
external finance. Both of them  can increase or decrease  the capital held in 
equilibrium. They also  identify two crucial  factors: the federal safety net(it 
includes federal deposit insurance, access to the discount window ,payment 
guarantees, etc.) which tends to decrease bank’s capital and the regulatory 
capital requirements that increases the capital of some banks.   
Hai Chin Yu(2000) examined capital structure of banks in Taiwan. He 
splitted banks in three groups: small medium and large by their asset size.He 
examined equity ratio  and its relationship with  five  independent 
variables(liquidity, intermediation spreads, profitability,bank size and money 
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market funds).He found that large banks had lower capital ratio from small 
banks.This happens because large banks surrogate  bank capital for 
regulator's capital because they think that they are 'too big to fail' and as a 
consequence they  rely on interior  cash flows for capitalization. According to 
his research the main determinants of capital ratios for   Taiwanese banks are 
:size, liquidity  and profitability . The relation among   equity to assets ratio 
and  liquidity ratio is  negative and significant for medium size banks but 
positive and significant for small banks. Moreover, medium-sized banks in 
Taiwan utilize  liquidity as a substitute for bank capital, on the other hand 
small banks with low liquidity usually   have lower capital ratios. 
Amidu (2007) conducted a research  in order to identify the 
determinants of capital structure of banks in Ghana.As dependant variables 
he used  leverage(the ratio total debt to total capital ), the long term debt  ratio 
(total long  term debt to total capital) and the short term debt  ratio (total short 
term debt to capital ).He used  as independent variables 
profitability,risk,tax,sales growth,asset structure and size.He suggested that 
profitability ,growth,bank size,asset structure and corporate tax influence 
financing decisions. Moreover he found a negative relation among leverage 
and profitability.Amidu in his survey  found that more than 87%  of assets of 
Ghanaian banks are financed by debts and  short term debt constitutes more 
than three quarters of the capital . 
Asarkaya and Ozkan(2007) examined the determinants of capital 
structure of Turkish banks for the period 2002-2006.They used panel data and 
they used the generalized method of moments in order to estimate their 
model.They tried to find  the reason  that banks hold more  capital than that 
required by the regulation.They used as dependant variable capital adequacy 
ratio and as explanatory variables risk( the ratio risk weighted assets in total 
assets), GDP (quarterly growth rate off gross domestic product),average 
capital adequacy ratio of the sector, ROE(inflation –adjusted return on 
equity),assets size adjusted by the consumer price index and share of 
deposits in non –equity liabilities. 
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They used once ROE and portfolio risk as endogenous variables an 
then as exogenous.They found that lagged capital has an important effect on 
current capital.Asset size, portfolio risk and share of deposits  are negatively 
correlated with capital adequacy ratio.However the growth rate of GDP and 
the average capital adequacy ratio of the sector are positive correlated with 
the capital adequacy ratio.The negative effect of asset size is because big  
banks hold less capital.The negative relation with share of deposits is due to 
the fact that banks when they have this ratio high they are thought less risky 
and as result they ought to have less buffer capital.  
Regarding the negative correlation with portfolio risk this is reasonable 
since banks with higher portfolio risk ought to have more capital to provide a 
buffer toward losses. Regarding the average capital adequacy ratio of the 
sector when this increases  banks in order to be competitive they believe that 
they have to increase their capital.Turkish banks in economic growth periods 
hold more capital since in these periods banks surrogate the reduction of 
capital during periods of economic downturn. Finally, they found that Return 
on equity  is insignificant but when they use deeper lags ROE become 
significant in explaining the dependent variable. 
Brewer, Kaufman and Wall(2008) in their paper inquired capital 
structure of banks and the impact  of   bank-specific variables, country-level 
macroeconomic conditions, country-level financial characteristics, significant  
public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country. They 
used an unbalanced panel of seventy-eight largest private banks in the world 
based  in twelve industrial countries for the period 1992-2005. 
The last two variables induced banks capital structure by inducing the  
magnitude  of  a bank’s safety-net,  the tautness of contention  in the banking 
sector,  the capability of bank regulators to interfere effectively in troubled 
banks and the width of capital standards.Capital structure is measured by two 
ratios: the ratio of tier 1 capital to BaseI I risk-weighted assets  in book values  
and the ratio of book value equity to total book value on-balance sheet assets 
(leverage ratio). The country-specific macro variables invoke the  size of the 
banking sector in the home country and  alterations in GDP . The bank-
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specific variables invoke asset size,  profitability and credit risk. The country 
regulatory and public policy variables invoke  seven variables representing the  
magnitude  of the bank safety-net, the tenseness  of external corporate 
governance in the home country and  the strength legislation. Also a number 
of control and fixed effect variables are specific. Due to alterations in the 
variables banks are supposed to reconcile their capital ratios in order to get 
the equilibrium prices. 
The results notify that independent variables explicate the leverage 
ratio better in the hypothesized direction than the Basel risk-weighted ratio. 
They found that  alterations in  tier 1 capital ratio are  correlated with most of 
the independent variables. However alterations in leverage ratio are highly 
correlated with public policy variables but less correlated with the other 
variables. Bank specific variables affect the capital ratios of banks.They state 
that banks keep higher capital ratios in countries where banking sector is 
small and in countries that have effective corporate governance structures 
and have more rigid capital requirements. 
 Moreover  Alfon et al (2004)found that banks in the United Kingdom 
has an individual capital adequacy requirement and Wong et al. (2005) 
arrived to the same conclusion for banks in Hong Kong. The differences of 
capital ratios among countries may be explained  up to an extent by the 
regulatory regimes  and public policy of each country.These differences it 
seems that constraint efforts of Basel I to deduct  differences in cross-country 
capital ratios between banks.  
Gropp and Heider (2010) study the determinants of  capital structure of  
large banks in Europe and United Sates for the period 1991 to 2004.Moreover 
they compared their findings with  those of the empirical literature of non 
financial companies.The dependent  variables they used are : market and 
book leverage, marker and book deposits, market and book non-deposit 
liabilities and Tier 1 capital ratio. As explanatory variable they used size, 
profit, market to book ratio,collateral,dividend, asset risk, GDP growth,stock 
market risk,term structure spead,inflation, coverage (GDP)  and coverage 
(Deposits). 
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First they took as dependent variable market leverage and as 
explanatory variables they took market to book ratio, profitability, the natural 
logarithm of total assets and collateral.They found all coefficients statistical 
significant at 1% level apart from collateral which was significant at 10% 
level.Bank’s  leverage was positive correlated with collateral and size and 
negative with the market to book ratio,dividends and profits.Also when they 
took as dependent variable book leverage the results were similar to that of 
market leverage.All coefficients were significant  at 1%level. Then they added 
in the regression  the  independent variable risk which had negative 
coefficient  for both book and market values. In this regression the other 
standard corporate finance determinants variables remained significant 
except  market to book ratio on book leverage which was found insignificant.  
When they used as dependent variables non deposits liabilities and 
deposits the signs  of the coefficients ,apart from  profits ,when the variable 
was non deposit liabilities were the same as before.However  the signs were 
different when the variable was deposits. Moreover risk was insignificant for 
all components of leverage. 
When they added to the model  as  explanatory variables coverage per 
capita GDP and coverage per average capita deposits  it was found a low 
impact on book leverage and  great correlation  to market leverage.When the 
used Tier 1 capital ratio in line with Basel 1 they reached similar findings with 
those when they used as dependent variable leverage.They stated that capital 
regulation was of second order importance in determining the capital 
structure.The only difference was that banks with  more collateral were more 
levered and keep more Tier 1 capital.  
But Barth et al (2005),Berger et al (2008) and Brewer at al.(2008) 
noticed that banks hold   more capital than the regulatory minimum.This 
happens maybe due to the fact that  raising equity on short notice, in order not 
to fall below the regulatory minimum, is  expensive. Adding GDP ,inflation, 
stock market volatility and the term structure of interest rates as independent 
variables to market and book leverage regressions Gropp and Heider (2010) 
found that only volatility of stock market was significant  at 10% level for book 
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and market leverage.They reached same conclusions when they made 
separate analysis for European and US banks alone. Summarizing Gropp and 
Heider(2010) stated that unobserved time invariant bank fixed effects are the 
most significant determinants of banks capital structure and that banks 
leverage converges to bank concrete ,time invariant targets. 
There are and other researchers who advocate that capital 
requirements are of second order importance in determing the capital 
srtructure of banks and that banks optimize their structure like non financial 
companies.Flannery(1994),Myers and Rajan(1998), Diamond and 
Rajan(2000) and Allen,Carletti and Marquez(2009)developed theories in 
which they  allegated that capital requirements were not constraining.   
Octavia and Brown(2010) examined whether the standard 
determinants of capital structure  apply to banks in developing countries.They 
found that they explained both book capital and market leverage.But the 
direction of the impact is not always the prospective.Moreover the buffer 
theory of excess capital can interpret  the amount of excess  book capital  that 
banks keep but the excess market capital kept from banks  is determined 
more by market pressures.  
Juca,De Sousa and Fishlow (2012) studied the determinants of  capital 
structure of North American Banks for the period before (2003-2006) and 
during the economic crisis (2007-2010).They used panel data and their  
sample  was constituted by thirty banks.The purpose of their study was  to 
find if determinants of non financial firms, risk off assets, deposit insurances 
and the compensation program for executive managers for the periods 2003 
to 2006 and 2007 to 2010 can  explain the financial leveraging level of banks 
at market value.  
They used as dependant variable financial leveraging at market value  
and as explanatory variables size, profit ,growth opportunity , guarantees ,  
payment of dividends, compensation program for executive managers , risk , 
market value of deposits  and market value of non-deposits .All explanatory 
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variables are  found significant except guarantees which has been excluded 
from their model.  
Juca et al(2012) found that leveraging at market value  was higher 
during 2007 to 2010 than the period 2003 to 2006.The negative relationship 
with size exists for smaller banks however bigger banks behave according the 
financial theory so they observed that the higher the bank size the higher the 
leverage. Regarding profitability and growth opportunity   they found a  
negative  relationship with leverage. Guarantees was found negative related 
to leverage where this outcome is contradictious   to financial theory. Risk had 
a significant but negative relationship with leverage.They found a positive 
coefficient among market value of deposits and leverage.At last compensation 
program for executive managers had low significant level and a negative 
relation with the dependant variable.They observed that despite in 2009 was 
the lowest amount of payment per capita of executive managers (US $ 11.71 
million) in that  year was the highest percentage of leveraging(92.10%). 
Allen, Nilapornkul and Powell (2013)examined the determinants of 
capital structure of Thai Banks for the period 1999-2008 and they compared 
with Japanese and  Malaysian banks.In their study they use not only internal 
bank variables but also market based risk variables.They employed fixed 
effects panel data analysis and the used market and book leverage as 
dependent variables. As explanatory variables they used bank size,growth 
opportunity, profitability, loan ratio, not performing loan, risk weighted asset 
distance to default, conditional value at risk and GDP growth rate.  
Profits and non performing  loans were found  negatively correlated 
with market leverage.But non performing loans had a positive relation with 
book leverage. Risk weighted  assets had a positive  relationship for market 
and for book leverage however statistical significance at 5% for book 
leverage. Conditional value at risk and distance to default  were negatively 
correlated to both leverages but with no significance. Regarding GDP growth 
rate, it  had a negative correlation for both leverages, however it was 
significant at 1% for market leverage. 
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  In Japanese banks market based variables influence market leverage 
because of the fluctuations in the market price of equities and assets.Also 
bank size, growth opportunity and profitability were significant at 1% level to 
book leverage. Furthermore conditional value at risk was significant at 1% for 
book leverage. 
 Regarding Malaysian banks, Allen et al (2013)found  that non 
performing loans had a positive correlation at significance level of 1% ,on the 
other hand risk weighted assets and loan ratio had a negative correlation to 
market leverage at  5% significance level. Moreover profitability, distance to 
default, bank size, non performing loans and conditional value at risk were 
significant at 1% for book leverage. 
Capital requirements have also been examined in the market discipline 
literature.Despite that bank market discipline is interested in banks’ risk 
taking,it also impacts their  capital structures. According to the surveys of 
Morgan and Stiroh(2001), Calomiris and Wilson(2004), Ashcraft(2008) and 
Flannery and Rangan(2008) relied on the market view ,capital structure of 
banks is affected by the pressures of debt holders, shareholders and 
depositors. Their findings  suggest that regulatory capital requirements are not 
a constraining factor for capital structure decisions. 
Concluding, there have been efforts to reform the regulatory 
environment due to the recent financial crisis.Brunnermeier et al. (2009), just 
as Grop and Heider (2010)distinguished regulatory  from a market based 
concept of bank capital. Greenlaw et all (2008) when searching the roots of 
the financial  crisis, they argue that active management of banks capital 
structure in relation to internal value at risk was the important  destabilizing 
factor and not the regulatory constrains. 
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5. Determinants of capital structure of banks and variable 
selection 
This part of the study provides information regarding the dependent 
and independent variables which we use to examine the capital structure of 
banks. Moreover we analyze the findings of former literature corresponding to 
these variables.We use as dependent variable leverage  and as explanatory 
variables LN(total assets),ROAA ,the ratio  fixed assets to total assets ,the 
ratio net loans to total assets, the ratio Liquid Assets to  Deposits & Sort term 
Funding ,the ratio loan loss provisions to total assets, inflation and GDP 
growth rate.The details of the variables are presented in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.: The mnemonic, definition and expected sign of the explanatory variables 
Variables Mnemonic Definition equation  Expected 
sign 
Dependent    
Leverage BKL 1-(book value of equity/book 
value of assets) 
 
Independent    
Size BZE  Ln(total assets) + 
Profitability ROAA  Net income/Average total  assets       - 
Tangibility TANGIB Fixed assets/Total assets + 
Liquidity NLTA Net loans/Total assets +/- 
Liquidity LASTF Liquidity assets/Deposits &short 
term funding 
- 
Assets 
quality 
LLPTA Loan loss provisions/Total assets ? 
GDP growth 
rate 
GGR GDP growth (annual %) (in 
constant US$ 2005) 
+/- 
Inflation INFL Consumer prices (annual %) +/- 
Source: Bank specific variables obtained from Bankscope Database. Macroeconomic factors 
obtained from the World Bank. 
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We use as dependent variable leverage which we calculate as  1 
minus the ratio of equity to total assets in book values(BKL). This variable 
includes both debt and non debt liabilities. We choose to use leverage than 
debt because according to Welch (2007) leverage in contrast to debt is well 
defined. Moreover we construct leverage in this way since it can be linked 
readily to the regulatory view of banks’ capital structure.The reason for taking 
book value is  that capital regulation is imposed only  on book values.Also 
leverage formation augments the sensitivity of equity to the underlying 
performance of the company.Leverage as dependent  variable is also used   
in other studies like these of Gropp and Heider(2010) ,Octavia and Brown 
(2010) and Allen et al.(2013). 
Concerning the independent variable size we measure it as in the most 
studies as the logarithm of total assets(BZE) .Trade of theory states that big 
companies  in contrast to  small choose debt financing  since they have   
lesser financial distress costs.On the other hand  pecking order theory states 
the existence of an reverse relationship among size and dept ratio since large 
companies can issue equity readily.The results for the relation among banks 
size and leverage are ambiguous. Gropp and Heider (2010) when examining 
large US and European banks found a positive association between leverage 
and the size of banks.Octavia and Brown (2010) also concluded that there is 
a positive relationship between leverage and size. 
 Juca et al.(2012) found that large banks behave according to finance 
theory and only  smaller banks have  a negative relationship among size and 
leverage.Allen et al (2013) found  for Thai banks a negative relation between 
leverage and size of  a bank but a positive relation was found for the  
developing country Malaysia and for the developed country Japan. This 
positive relation is verified by most surveys and for non financial firms  with 
few exceptions. For example Rajan and Zingales(1995)when examing firms in 
G-7 countries  and Frank and Goyal (2004) for US firms found a positive 
relation.Altough  Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a positive association  for 
G7 countries there was the exception of Germany. 
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We use ROAA in order to measure banks profitability .ROAA is 
computed as the net income of a bank divided by average total assets.It is 
frequently used by banks and other financial institutions as a means to 
estimate their performance.The association between leverage and profitability 
is based on the theory used.  
Trade-off theory states that profitable companies have more needs to 
shield income from corporate tax and should borrow more than less profitable 
companies.Pecking order theory predicts an inverse association between 
profitability and leverage.Companies are assumed to prefer internal to 
external financing.Companies use retain earnings first and if retain earnings 
are inadequate then they use external financing. When companies have to 
choose between bonds and equity they prefer debt from equity issue. So  
profitable companies borrow less since they have adequate internal funds but 
on the other hand less profitable companies use debt because of less 
available internal funds. According to agency  cost theory there is a positive 
association between profitability and leverage. In a signaling framework, 
profitable companies are assumed to utilize debt as a signal of the company’s 
quality. 
Gropp and Heider (2010),Octavia and Brown (2010) and Juca et al 
(2012). found that banks leverage depends negatively  on profits.They 
suggest that more profitable banks prefer less leverage financing.Allen et 
al.(2013) found for Japanese banks a negative association among leverage 
and profitability.For Malaysian banks a negative relationship between book 
leverage and profitability but a positive with market leverage.Moreover they 
found for Thai banks a negative relationship between market leverage and 
profitability but  a contradictory  sign  for book leverage.In empirical studies for 
non financial firms there is also confirmation  of the negative association  
between profitability and leverage while a positive association is scarcely 
supported by studies.A negative relation was found in the studies of Titman 
and Wessels (1988) Rajan and Zingales(1995) and Frank and Goyal (2004). 
Regarding the independent variable tangibility we use the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets(TANGIB) since this ratio is most often used in studies. 
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Tangibility of assets is used to reckon  the level of collateral a company 
renders to its debtors.Theories suggest the existence of a positive association 
between leverage and tangibility since a high fraction of tangible assets helps  
the lender to reduce the risk suffering from the agency cost of debt. According 
to pecking order theory selling secure debt can be good for the firm since it 
decreases the cost of the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Companies with more intangible assets have higher costs of capital 
due to the fact that monitoring is more difficult. So companies with lot tangible 
assets  are expected  to have more debt. 
Most of the empirical studies found a direct association between the 
level of debt and tangible assets.Gropp and Heider (2010) found a positive 
relationship between leverage and collateral. Octavia and Brown (2010) found 
a negative association both for market and book leverage when they used as 
cross section identifier bank .But positive when they used  as cross section 
identifier CAP( CAP includes the minimum capital ratios enjoined on banks so 
that banks from  various countries but with same minimum capital ratio are 
considered coming from the same group).They observed that the magnitude 
of the coefficient is small. This happens maybe because of the fact that banks 
in developing countries keep a higher percentage of collateral than developed 
countries. The benefit of having one extra dollar of collateral to secure debt  
could be reduced.They stated that the negative association shows that having 
more collateral is value decreasing for banks in issuing new debt. 
 Moreover Rajan and Zingales(1995) stated  that lenders give  loans 
more easily if a balance sheet of a company has a high amount of tangible 
assets and this results to higher leverage. Some other studies of non financial 
firms, with the same findings of a positive relationship between leverage and 
tangibility are those of    Frank and Goyal (2004) and  Shah and Khan(2007) . 
Shah and Khan studied the determinants of capital structure of non financial 
firms in Pakistan. 
In many studies liquidity is used as explanatory variable to measure its 
effect on leverage of a company. In 2006 the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) published a series of Financial Soundness Indicators based on a 
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common methodology for 62 countries, including European Union Countries, 
the Compilation Guide on FSIs. Liquidity indicators are utilized to show the 
level of liquidity which influences the capacity of banks to withstand shocks. 
Banks should maintain a level of liquidity in order to confront their obligations 
differently they may go bankrupt. So according to supervisory authorities a 
ratio that is suggested for research is liquid assets to short term liabilities. 
Moreover according to pecking order theory companies prefer internal 
financing from external. So if companies have sufficient liquid assets to 
finance their investments there will be no need to raise external funds. Thus 
liquidity is expected to be negatively correlated to leverage. 
 In our thesis we use two liquidity ratio net loans to total assets(NLTA) 
and liquid assets to deposits & short term funding (LASTF).Net loans to total 
assets evinces the percentage of total assets which bounded for the granting 
of loans.So when this ratio increases  liquidity decreases.The ratio liquid 
assets to deposits and short term funding measures the ability of a bank to 
meet its short term obligations from its current assets.Allen et a(2013) when 
examining the relationship between leverage and the ratio net loans to total 
deposits found a negative association between them. Ozkan(2001) examined 
UK firms and he found a negative effect of liquidity  on the borrowing 
decisions of firms. Also Guney et al.(2011) found a negative association 
between leverage and liquidity when studding Chinese listed firms. 
We also examine in our thesis the loss loan provisions that a bank 
makes. Loss loan provision is an expense that is reserved for defaulted loans 
or credits.  It is an amount set aside in the event that the loan defaults.Banks 
adjust  each year the level of loan loss provisions based on the riskiness of 
the loans in their portfolio. Bank regulators demand  frequently  screening of 
bank loan portfolios, classifying  each asset or group of assets by market 
conditions, collateral condition, and other business risk factors. In  a case of a 
loss, the bank can utilize  the amount set aside to cover the loss and not  
having  a loss in its cash flows.The ratio provisions to total assets shows the 
quality of the assets of a bank and a high ratio reveals a bad quality of the 
assets furthermore shows that more provisions are needed to be taken from a 
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bank.In our thesis we take the ratio loan loss provisions to total assets. 
According to Basel II banks ought to take more provisions because of the high 
volume of the non performing loans which lead in a reduction in equity.  We 
expect a positive relationship between leverage and the ratio loan loss 
provisions to total assets since an increase to provisions leads to a decrease 
to equity and as a consequence a bank will have to use external funds to 
cover its obligations. 
Ιn our study we also examine two  microeconomic variables since 
banks are  affected by external factors.We examine the influence of annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices and inflation.GDP is the sum 
of all the products and services that are produced in an  economy expressed 
in financial units.It is the market value of all officially identified  final goods and 
services produced within a country in a year, or other given period of time 
regardless these products are produced from manufacturing units belonging 
of residents from other countries.It includes, private inventories government 
purchases, personal consumption, paid-in construction costs and the foreign 
trade balance.  The GDP Annual Growth Rate shows a percentage change in 
the GDP value compared to previous year. GDP has an effect on nearly 
everyone within an economy .The growth of GDP reveals that an economy 
blossoms and has a positive influence on firms,on the other hand a negative 
GDP growth influence negatively  firms since is a sign that an economy is in 
recession. 
Gropp and Heider (2010) found a positive correlation between leverage 
and GDP growth for book leverage but a negative for market  leverage. 
Octavia and Brown(2010) found a negative association between market and 
book leverage and GDP growth . Moreover they stated that adding this 
macroeconomic variable does not alter the statistical significance and the sign 
of the coefficients of the standard determinants of capital structure. Allen et 
al.(2013) found a positive relationship between market leverage and GDP 
growth for Japanese and Malaysian banks but negative for Thai banks. But for 
book leverage they found a negative relationship for all countries. 
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Inflation is considered an important indicator since  is the rate at which 
the general level of prices for goods and services is increasing, and, 
subsequently, purchasing power is decreasing.Inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index shows  the annual percentage alteration  in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may 
be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Generally, the 
Laspeyres formula is used.  
Gropp and Heider (2010) stated that they obtained similar results with 
non financial firms  and that controlling for macro economic factors does not 
increase the fit of the leverage regressions. Specifically, they found a  positive 
relationship between book leverage and inflation and a negative with market 
leverage. A positive correlation was found   and from Frank and Goyal (2004) 
when examining American firms. They stated that for book leverage the effect 
of inflation is not reliable and that  when inflation is expected to be high, firms 
tend to have high leverage. 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
6.1. Data  
The target population of our study refers to listed commercial banks in 
European Union of 15.The countries are : Austria,Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece,Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,Portgul, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom .The final sample is comprised by 76 
banks. We select listed banks since are considered a homogenous group of 
companies with a comparable production technology. Our data come from two 
sources. We obtain data for the dependent and explanatory bank specific 
variables from the Bankscope database of  the Bureau van Dijk. Data for the 
macroeconomic variables we obtain from the World Bank.  
The information for the variables we take it from the consolidated 
balance sheets and income statements of the banks. The period we examine 
is 2007 until 2012 because at that point the global financial economic 
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recession started  and we want to examine its impact to the financing 
decisions of banks, if the crisis  changes  what until then  influence banks 
decisions. Moreover we choose as stating point 2007 because in that year 
Basel II started to be implemented despite the fact that it was initially  
published in 2004 ,since  it was difficult to be implemented in the regulatory 
environment prior to 2007. 
Firstly we try to use as dependent variable the total capital ratio in 
order to find the impact of regulation to capital structure decisions  but 
Bankscope database  has many missing values so we conclude to use only 
leverage as dependent variable.However  from   the graph  below  we 
observe that with only a few exceptions ,when data is available, banks have 
higher total capital ratio than the regulatory minimum. Banks hold a significant 
discretionary total capital ratio and as Gropp and Heider(2010) stated it is 
difficult to show a first order effect of regulation for banks capital structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of total capital ratio 
 
 
Finally we use leverage as dependent variable and  size, profitability, 
tangibility liquidity, assets quality, gdp growth and inflation as explanatory 
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variables. Our sample consists of 452 observations. Table 3 provides 
descriptive statistics for the variables we use. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev Skewness Kyrtosis 
BKL 0.905475 0.926776 1.039305 0.191388 0.091406 -4.464512 29.37096 
BZE 23.29183 22.87769 28.75110 17.89531 2.830346 0.178109 1.860537 
ROAA 0.003249 0.004455 0.202530 -0.211010 0.021388 -1.601770 46.81727 
TANGIB 0.013099 0.009818 0.244019 0.000157 0.023469 7.617491 68.02296 
NLTA 0.579374 0.627595 0.916280 0.014350 0.196493 -1.271918 3.958341 
LASTF 0.286127 0.206250 2.000000 0.008180 0.249007 2.279517 10.77934 
LLPTA 0.007935 0.005015 0.148430 -0.038181 0.012371 5.114000 47.84099 
GGR -0.002850 0.003735 0.065568 -0.085386 0.029291 -0.704264 2.775744 
INFL 0.021706 0.022977 0.048799 -0.044799 0.011256 -1.054960 7.792982 
See table 2 for the definition of variables. 
 
We  point out some interesting findings from the descriptive 
statistics.We observe that the mean value  of book leverage is 0.905475 
which is relative similar to those of Gropp and Heider(2010) who found a 
mean 0.926.Its standard deviation is  0.091406 , its minimum value is 
0.191388 and its maximum value is  1.039305.It is obvious a wide range in is 
rates.The ranking of  the mean value of bank size is 23.29183 however we 
find a high variability (standard deviation).Profitability is quite low and this is in 
line with Gropp and Heider(2010) who stated that banks are low return 
industry.Tangiblty has a  wide range of values , a maximum value of 0.244019 
and a minimum of 0.000157.Liquidity ratios have both a high variability but the 
mean value of the ratio  net loans to total assets is two times greater than the 
ratio liquid assets to deposits and short term funding. Loan loss provisions to 
total assets have a low mean value of 0.007935.Regarding the two 
macroeconomic indicators inflation has a mean value of 0.021706 and GDP 
growth a negative mean value of 0.002850. 
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Table 4 shows the correlation matrix among the variables used in the 
regression analysis. Larger banks tend to have lower profits, higher leverage 
and lower collateral value. More profitable banks tend to have lower leverage. 
Leverage is positive correlated with  the loss loan provisions that a bank 
makes.An interesting finding is the  negative correlation between profitability 
and the ratio net loans to total assets although we would expect a positive 
correlation since the higher the amount of loans the higher the profits of a 
bank.This association  maybe resulted from the large number of defaulted 
loans. We find  the highest  negative correlation among  the variables 
leverage and tangibility. Furthermore we observe  a high negative correlation 
between the variable  loan loss provisions  to total assets and profitability.The 
results show no collinear variables because no correlation exceed 0.8 as 
reported in table 4.Generally, the majority of the correlations  corresponds to 
the findings in capital structure literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations of variables 
 BKL BZE GGR INFL LASTF LLPTA NLTA ROAA TANGIB 
BKL 1.00000         
BZE 0.49921 1.00000        
GGR -0.03685 0.01727 1.00000       
INFL 0.05301 -0.06117 0.26950 1.00000      
LASTF -0.29421 0.20433 0.12260 -0.12520 1.00000     
LLPTA 0.09232 -0.12608 -0.34715 0.04701 -0.20866 1.00000    
NLTA 0.29294 -0.12320 -0.11024 0.13891 -0.67739 0.26481 1.00000   
ROAA -0.43951 -0.12285 0.27234 -0.08981 0.20473 -0.66470 -0.19005 1.00000  
TANGIB -0.76172 -0.29076 -0.00802 -0.00935 0.31780 -0.01469 -0.23098 0.25564 1.00000 
See table 2 for the definition of variables. 
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6.2. Methodology 
 Having reviewed a number of literature for capital structure of firms  we 
will now conduct an empirical  study on commercial  listed  banks of European 
Union of 15countries.We will  try to answer the following research  questions: 
 What are the determinants of banks capital structure? 
 How are these determinants influence banks borrowing decision? 
For the examination of the influence of bank specific and macroeconomic 
factors on banks leverage we use the following equation 
   yit =a + bxit  + uit  
where yit  is the dependent variable , a is the intercept, b is a Kx1 vector of 
parameters to be to be estimated on the independent variables and xit is a 
1xk  vector of observations on the independent variables, t=1,..,T and 
i=1,….N and Uit  is the error term.   
 We use panel data in our analysis, since panel data have two 
dimensions, a time dimension and a cross section dimension.They consist 
observations on a number of economic units over a number of  time periods. 
We decided to use panel data because  as we mentioned above we  want to 
examine our variables through time, period 2007-2012. Firstly we estimate an 
equation with only the bank specific variables and at a second step we 
recalculate our model by adding the macroeconomic factors. 
 All statistic and econometric methodology has been employed in 
Eviews 7 with the method of Least Squares also we have used Microsoft 
Excel. Firstly we estimate a model with only bank specific explanatory 
variables  and then a model with all explanatory variables both bank specific 
and macroeconomic factors. We estimate both models with neither fixed nor 
random effects which implies a simple pooled regression.But pooled 
regression assume that the intercepts are the same for each bank and for 
every year.This is an inappropriate affair  because normally this does not 
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happen. Instead we estimate a fixed effect model  for both regressions  with 
only cross section fixed.Next in order to determine if fixed effects are essential  
we run a Redunant fixed effects-Likelihood Ratio test for both regressions. 
The results suggest that the appropriate model to use for both regressions are 
cross sectional fixed effects and period fixed effects.The probability values 
related with the test statistics notify that the restrictions of the Redundant fixed 
effects-Likelihood Ratio are not verified by the data. 
Furthermore in order to decide if it is better to use the random effect 
rather than fixed effect we conduct the Hausman Test.In both regressions the 
p-value of the test is less than 1% ,this suggests that we have to reject the 
null hypothesis that  Random effect model is appropriate and this means that 
the fixed effect model is to be preffered.We conclude to the following two 
equations 
BkLict =bo +b1BZEict+b2ROAAict+b3TANGIBict+b4NLTAict+b5LASTFict+b6LLPTAict 
+ct+cc+uict   (1) 
BkLict=bo+b1BZEict+b2ROAAict+b3TANGIBict+b4NLTAict+b5LASTFict+b6LLPTAict 
+ b7GGRct+b8INFLct+ct+cc+uict   (2) 
6.3. Results 
As we have mentioned above in order to examine the determinants of 
bank capital structure for the period 2007-2012 we initially  assess a 
regression with only bank specific variables(equation 1)  and another with 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables(equation 2).The results are 
presented in the  following manner.Table 5 presents  the regression results for 
equation (1) and table 6 presents the regression results for equation (2). 
Considering table 5 with the dependent variable book leverage we 
observe that all explanatory variables are significant  at 1% level except the 
ratio loan loss provision to total assets(LLPTA) which is insignificant.Size of 
banks is significant  at 1% level and has a positive correlation with  book 
leverage.This is consistent with the findings of previous studies(Gropp and 
Heider(2010), Octavia and Brown (2010). 
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The ratio liquid assets to Deposits &short term funding and net loans to 
total assets are both significant at 1% level and correlate negatively to book 
leverage .As we have mentioned the ratio liquid assets to deposits and short 
term funding measures the ability of a bank to meet its short term obligations 
from its current assets.Our findings is consistent with these of Allen et 
all(2013). Net loans to total assets evinces the percentage of total assets 
which bounded for the granting of loans.The higher the ratio the lower the 
liquidity of a bank.So  as more  capital  is constrained  in order to grand loans 
this shall result in higher leverage for a bank.So we  would expect a positive 
correlation with leverage but we find a negative. Moreover high  amount of 
loans usually results to more profits and this results to more equity and as a 
consequence the firm can be   internally financed.But in our study there is a 
negative correlation between the ratio net loans to total assets and ROAA and 
this maybe  the reason for  our finding.    
Loss loan provision is an expense that is reserved for defaulted loans 
or credits.  It is an amount set aside in the event that the loan defaults. 
Provisions is an element of the balance sheet which reflects capital which is 
relegated in order to meet obligations in the future. Loss loan provisions 
consists a basic element of the equity of banks.The bank use its equity or 
borrowed funds in order to acquire assets which will generate profits.We 
expect a positive relationship between leverage and the ratio loan loss 
provisions to total assets since an increase to provisions leads to a decrease 
to equity and as a consequence a bank will have to use external funds to 
cover its obligations.Our finding suggest that the ratio  loss loan provisions to 
total assets is statistically insignificant  and exist  a negative correlation.  
In this thesis we use ROAA as proxy for profitability.We find  ROAA 
statistical significant at 1% level with a negative correlation with leverage.The 
result is the expected one.A high profitability increases the equity of bank 
through retained earnings.Retained earnings are profits that are not 
distributed to shareholders  and remain to the firm in order to be reinvested.As 
a result the highest the retained earnings the lesser banks use external 
funding.Our finding is consistent with the majority of empirical studies which 
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confirm the negative correlation between profitability and leverage (like Gropp 
and Heider (2010),Octavia and Brown (2010) and Juca et al (2012)). 
Regarding tangibility we measure it as the ratio fixed assets over total 
assets.We find  tangibility significant at 5% level but with a negative 
correlation.This is in contrast to the theories of capital structure which state 
that tangibility is positive  related to leverage .Because  tangible assets can be 
utilized as collateral in external borrowing.Moreover Gropp and Heider(2010) 
found a positive relation between leverage and collateral.This happens may 
be  due to the fact that banks have investment in opaque assets and this 
amplifies the chances of bankruptcy.Furthermore its difficult for outsiders to 
assess the risk of banks.Moreover our findings are consistent with these of 
Octavia and Brown(2010)  who also find a negative correlation.Moreover a 
study of Dakalalis and Psilaki(2008) when examining non financial firms they 
also stated  the existence of negative correlation.They explained that this 
possible happens  because companies  with lots of tangible assets may have 
found a stable source of return which provides them more internally generated 
funds and discourage them from turning to external financing. 
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Table 5 : Regression results with only bank specific variables 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.098583 0.139256 -0.707925 0.4794 
BZE 0.045316 0.005847 7.750479 0.0000*** 
LASTF -0.061034 0.007447 -8.196178 0.0000*** 
LLPTA -0.061034 0.115987 -0.407664 0.6838 
NLTA -0.047284 0.017450 -2.682874 0.0076*** 
ROAA -0.622957 0.059460 -10.47696 0.0000*** 
TANGIB -0.338814 0.168913 -2.005850 0.0456** 
Effects Specification  
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
Period fixed (dummy variables)   
R-squared 0.975356     Mean dependent var  0.905475  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.969466     S.D. dependent var  0.091406 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.015972     Akaike info criterion  -5.263068 
Sum 
squared 
resid 
0.092862     Schwarz criterion  -4.462174 
Log 
likelihood 
1277.453     Hannan-Quinn criter.  -4.947464 
F-statistic 165.5914     Durbin-Watson stat  
  
1.154573 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000000    
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) reflect in significance at level of10%,5% and 1% respectively.  
See table 2 for the definition of variables.  
     
Concerning table 6 we observe that when we add in our model the two 
macroeconomic variables neither the significance of the other variables is 
influenced nor the sign of their correlation with the dependent variable. There 
37 
 
are minor alterations in the magnitude of the coefficients but they are 
insignificant.We find GDP growth to have  a negative relation  with book 
leverage but is statistically insignificant.The results from other empirical 
studies are ambiguous. Gropp and Heider (2010) found a positive correlation 
between leverage and GDP growth for book leverage but a negative for 
market  leverage.Allen et al.(2013) found a positive relationship between 
market leverage and GDP growth for Japanese and Malaysian banks but 
negative for Thai banks.But for book leverage they found a negative 
relationship for all countries.  
Regarding the macroeconomic factor inflation  is significant at 5% 
level but the dependent variable book leverage depends upon inflation 
negatively.Gropp and Heider (2010) find that lower inflation is related with 
significant higher market but not book leverage. Generally inflation increases 
bank debt but it does matter if inflation is anticipated or unanticipated.Since 
our examined period is the crisis period the inflation was unanticipated 
because of the economic crisis and the unstable economy so this may be the 
reason for our finding.     
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Table 6 : Regression results with bank specific variables and macroeconomic variables 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.137411 0.139437 -0.985474 0.3250 
BZE 0.047159 0.005868 8.036402 0.0000*** 
GGR -0.096384 0.059862 -1.610094 0.1082 
INFL -0.246717 0.121405 -2.032181 0.0429** 
LASTF -0.060558 0.007414 -8.168085 0.0000*** 
LLPTA -0.061428 0.116955 -0.525226 0.5997 
NLTA -0.045058 0.017360 -2.595537 0.0098*** 
ROAA -0.590723 0.060915 -9.697534 0.0000*** 
TANGIB -0.351194 0.168307 -2.086630 0.0376** 
Effects Specification  
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)   
R-squared 0.975784     Mean dependent var  0.905475 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.969830     S.D. dependent var  0.091406 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.015877     Akaike info criterion  -5.271711 
Sum 
squared 
resid 
0.091252     Schwarz criterion  -4.452615 
Log 
likelihood 
1281.407     Hannan-Quinn criter.  -4.948934 
F-statistic 163.8933     Durbin-Watson stat  1.139978 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000000    
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) reflect in significance at level of10%,5% and 1% respectively.         
See table 2 for the definition of variables.  
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7.Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study   was to examine  the determinants of capital 
structure of banks by using panel data analysis. Our sample consists of listed 
commercial banks of the European Union of 15countries and the examining 
period is 2007 until 2012.Our first sample was consisted of 85 banks but we 
find many missing values for some banks  so we conclude  to  a final sample 
of 76 banks  and 452 obsevations.We run two  regression one with only bank 
specific variables and another with bank specific and macroeconomic factors. 
We find that the standard determinants of capital structure have an 
explanatory power in financing decisions of banks during the financial crisis. 
We find statistically significant at 1% level the following variables: size of a 
bank, profitability,   the ratio liquid assets to Deposits &short term funding and  
the ratio net loans to total assets.We find statistically significant at 5% level 
tangibility but the ratio loan loss provisions to total assets is insignificant. 
 When we include in our model jointly inflation and GDP growth we 
observe  that neither the significance of the other variables is influenced nor 
the sign of their correlation with the dependent variable.Furthermore we find 
that GDPgrowth is statistically insignificant while inflation is significant at 5% 
level. 
Through this study we intended to contribute to the limited literature on 
the influence that has the recent financial crisis on the factors that are related 
with banks leverage.Though, it must be noted that this study is not intended at 
exhausting the issue addressed and arriving to definitive deductions.Its basic 
purpose is a better understanding of the determinants of the capital structure 
of banks during the financial crisis period. 
Concluding we propose the performance of future studies with larger 
sample and concerning some other factors like concentration ratio,share price 
volatility and the diversification of  managers compensation . 
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